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Note 
The Admission of Scientific Evidence in a Post-
Crawford World 
Eric Nielson* 
The search for truth is foundational in science1 and law.2 
However, the methods and measures used by these two fields 
are not the same. Science defines truth as the objective result 
of a reproducible process or method.3 In its evaluation of scien-
tific evidence, the courts have adopted this approach also.4 In 
contrast, the law rarely has the privilege of repeat experimen-
tation or blind studies. Further, the law views truth as a means 
to the end of a just resolution of a dispute.5 The law necessarily 
                                                          
© 2013 Eric Nielson 
* Eric Nielson has a B.S. in Chemical Engineering, a M.S. in Biomedical 
Engineering, and worked for fourteen years as a research and development 
engineer. 
 1. See, e.g., LINUS PAULING, NO MORE WAR! 209 (1958) (“Science is the 
search for the truth . . . .”). 
 2. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102. The rule states that “[t]hese rules should 
be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifia-
ble expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the 
end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 3. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) 
(“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe. In-
stead, it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explana-
tions about the world . . . .” (quoting Brief for American Ass’n for the Ad-
vancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae at 7–8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102))). 
 4. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580 (“Many considerations will bear on the in-
quiry [of whether testimony is scientifically valid and applies to the facts at 
issue], including whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has 
been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its 
known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance 
within a relevant scientific community.”). 
 5. Id. at 596–97 (“Yet there are important differences between the quest 
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific 
conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must 
resolve disputes finally and quickly.”). 
NIELSON_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  12:05 PM 
952 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
takes a more pragmatic view of truth than science’s Platonic 
ideal. Facts must be tested and proven, but not absolutely cer-
tain, before they will sustain the burden of proof.6 If the proven 
facts cannot sustain the verdict, the moving party has not es-
tablished a basis for its claims and the redress sought will be 
denied.7 
Prior to the Crawford v. Washington decision in 2004,8 the 
Supreme Court had applied a reliability standard for the ad-
mission of out-of-court testimony.9 This standard applied to a 
growing array of scientific evidence including blood alcohol test-
ing, general forensics, and nascent DNA testing.10 Crawford 
represented a significant change, with the conservative and lib-
eral wings of the Court joining to assert that the Sixth 
Amendment guaranteed the defendant a right to exclude testi-
monial evidence when the defendant was denied the opportuni-
ty to cross-examine the witness.11 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts subsequently extended this rule to apply to scientific 
evidence.12 
The goal of this Note is to evaluate the requirements for 
admitting scientific evidence in criminal cases. Part I discusses 
Confrontation Clause case law since Ohio v. Roberts,13 exam-
ines the standards for the admission of scientific evidence, and 
considers the weaknesses of cross-examination and eyewitness 
testimony. Part II discusses actions that can be taken to im-
prove the quality of scientific information available to defense 
attorneys, prosecutors, the courts, and the public. This Note 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (1962) (“(1) No person may be 
convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant 
is assumed.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 15–23. 
 10. Cf. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 357–60 app. A 
(2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that pre-Crawford authorities found 
the Confrontation Clause did not require confrontation of, and found reliable, 
analysts conducting routine scientific tests (including blood alcohol testing), as 
well as autopsy results and hospital reports describing victims’ injuries). 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 30–39. 
 12. Melendez-Diaz, 577 U.S. at 311. See also id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (“The Court sweeps away an accepted rule governing the admission of 
scientific evidence. Until today, scientific analysis could be introduced into ev-
idence without testimony from the ‘analyst’ who produced it.”). 
 13. Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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concludes that holding scientific evidence to the Daubert v. 
Merrel Dow Pharmacueticals, Inc. standard, coupled with pub-
lic disclosure, facilitates the just and effective operation of our 
criminal justice system. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The issue of which out-of-court statements may be consid-
ered at trial has been around for a long time.14 This issue is a 
central concern of the Federal Rules of Evidence15 and a foun-
dational component of the Sixth Amendment,16 which guaran-
tees the accused the right to confront witnesses.17 The Found-
ers were aware of the importance of this right due, in part, to 
the prominent case of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted, 
and executed, based on an affidavit from a convicted traitor 
seeking leniency.18 The concern over the admission of out-of-
court testimony of this sort (i.e., ex parte examination) shaped  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 14. See, e.g., John 8:10 to 8:12 (International Standard Version) (“Jesus 
stood up and asked her, ‘Dear lady, where are your accusers? Hasn’t anyone 
condemned you?’ ‘No one, sir,’ she replied. Then Jesus said, ‘I don’t condemn 
you, either. Go home, and from now on don’t sin anymore.’”). See also Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 62 (“The basic rule against hearsay, of course, is riddled with ex-
ceptions developed over three centuries.”). 
 15. This reflects the truism that “hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,” and “stem from the 
same roots.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (first quote); Dut-
ton, Warden v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (second quote). It also responds 
to the need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials. 
Cf. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (“These means of testing accuracy are so important 
that the absence of proper confrontation at trial calls into question the ulti-
mate integrity of the fact-finding process.” (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (qutoing Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 
(1969)))(internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally FED. R. EVID. 801–
07 (providing the federal rules relating to hearsay evidence). 
 16. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (“[The right of con-
frontation]’s denial or significant diminution calls into question the ultimate 
integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the competing interest 
be closely examined.” (quoting Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) 
(internal quotations omitted)); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (using similar lan-
guage). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 18. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). 
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Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,19 and pushed for the norm 
that testimony in open court be subject to cross-examination.20 
A. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASE LAW 
The 1980 decision of Ohio v. Roberts established the basis 
for admission of out-of-court testimony in criminal cases that 
did not fall within an established hearsay exception.21 The 
judge was expected to weigh the “indicia of reliability” of the 
out-of-court statements for “particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.”22 This required the judge to evaluate the credibil-
ity of the evidence,23 a role traditionally reserved for the jury.24 
Under the Roberts standard, courts admitted a wide variety of 
scientific evidence premised on its reliability.25 These admis-
                                                          
 19. Id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use 
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these practic-
es that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh’s; that the 
Marian statutes invited; that English law’s assertion of a right to confronta-
tion was meant to prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric decried. The 
Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind.”). 
 20. The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a 
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial. See Green, 399 U.S. at 157 
(“[I]t is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of the trial that 
forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.”); see also 
id. at 182 (Harlan, J. concurring) (arguing generally for an availability rule 
requiring “production of a witness when he is available to testify”). 
 21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 22. Id. at 66 (“In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing 
that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In oth-
er cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness.”). 
 23. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable 
by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation . . . . The 
Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, 
based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.”). 
 24. In considering expert testimony, the court should consider “(1) wheth-
er the testimony is relevant; (2) whether it is within the juror’s common 
knowledge and experience; and (3) whether it will usurp the juror’s role of 
evaluating a witness’s credibility.” United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 
1117, 1123 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 25. Prior to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause was held not to require 
confrontation of the analyst who conducted the following scientific tests: la-
boratory drug report, blood-alcohol test, laboratory analysis of victim’s bodily 
fluid, footprint, fingerprint, treating physician’s report of victim’s injuries, au-
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sions corresponded with an increase in the use of scientific evi-
dence due to advances in technological availability,26 as well as 
evolving jury expectations, sometimes attributed to the “CSI ef-
fect.”27 Cases that in earlier times would have been established 
solely by sworn testimony of a single law enforcement officer 
were now supported with video recordings and analytical test-
ing.28 
This reliability standard persisted until 2004, when the 
Court overturned the Roberts decision in Crawford v. Washing-
ton.29 Crawford sought out a man who had attempted to rape 
his wife earlier that same day and killed the man in the result-
                                                          
topsy report, hospital record stating victim’s cause of death, coroner’s written 
inquest stating cause of death, blood test showing presence of illegal drug, 
treating physician’s report describing victim’s injuries, treating physician’s 
report of defendant’s injuries, laboratory report stating that murder victim’s 
blood contained poison, certificate that police car’s speedometer was in work-
ing order, and certificate that breathalyzer was in working order. Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305  app. A at 357–58 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 26. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988) (illustrating an early use of DNA); see also Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 
1139, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“In Andrews, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal . . . held that DNA profile evidence was properly admitted in a criminal 
trial.”); see generally 54 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 381–525 (“This article is 
intended to describe briefly the instrumental techniques that are in use in civ-
il and criminal legal cases in 1999, and also to catalogue some of the substanc-
es that are commonly subject to instrumental analysis.”). 
 27. See Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429 (2006). Though Podlas ul-
timately finds no difference between CSI viewers and non-viewers in evidence 
assessment, she defines the “CSI Effect” as follows: 
  “The CSI Effect” has been defined in three different ways. The 
best-known definition states that CSI creates unreasonable expecta-
tions on the part of jurors, making it more difficult for prosecutors to 
obtain convictions. The second definition, which runs contrary to the 
first, refers to the way that CSI raises the stature of scientific evi-
dence to virtual infallibility, thus making scientific evidence impene-
trable. The final definition focuses on CSI’s increasing lay interest in 
forensics and science. 
Id. at 433. 
 28. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 n.3 (2011) (“The trial 
judge noted that, when he started out in law practice, ‘there were no breath 
tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop, and the cop said, “Yeah, he 
was drunk.”’”). See also Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1129 (describing admis-
sion into evidence of a videotape recording of a traffic stop in the trial at issue 
and finding no error). 
 29. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring) (“In choosing the path it does, the Court of course overrules Ohio 
v. Roberts . . . .”). 
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ing fight.30 Crawford was charged with murder and claimed 
self-defense.31 The prosecution sought to introduce statements 
made by Crawford’s wife during police interrogation shortly af-
ter the incident.32 Crawford’s wife did not testify in court due to 
spousal privilege.33 Crawford claimed the prosecution’s intro-
duction of out-of-court testimony violated his Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation, as he was not able to cross-examine the 
witness.34 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reject-
ed the admission of the out-of-court testimony due to its nature 
as “testimonial” evidence.35 However, it was not clear how far 
the right of confrontation extended.36 Specifically, it was not 
clear if the right only applied to traditional witnesses (like the 
statement in Crawford) or if it also applied to scientific evi-
dence and experts. The concurrence from Justices Rehnquist 
and O’Conner indicated uneasiness in abandoning the Roberts 
test, which would have simply excluded the testimony as unre-
liable.37 The Court further recognized that this definition of tes-
timonial statements would not apply to public records and 
business records.38 
In 2006, Davis v. Washington unanimously held that not 
all statements made to police officers are testimonial and there-
fore subject to the confrontation right.39 The admission of a 911 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 38. 
 31. Id. at 40. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (“Petitioner countered that . . . admitting the evidence would vio-
late his federal constitutional right to be ‘confronted with the witnesses 
against him.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI)). 
 35. Id. at 37, 68–69 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability [of 
the witness] and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”). 
 36. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232 (2012) (“Crawford has 
resulted in a steady stream of new cases in this Court.”). 
 37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 69 (“I 
believe that the Court’s adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause is not backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule long-
established precedent. Its decision casts a mantle of uncertainty over future 
criminal trials in both federal and state courts, and is by no means necessary 
to decide the present case.”). 
 38. Id. at 76 (“To its credit, the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at 
least some hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official rec-
ords. . . . To hold otherwise would require numerous additional witnesses 
without any apparent gain in the truth-seeking process.”). 
 39. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
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call in which the victim identified the defendant, who had re-
cently assaulted her in violation of a domestic no-contact order, 
was nontestimonial,40 despite the defendant having fled the 
scene prior to the call being made.41 In contrast, a statement 
written in police presence while separated from the assailant 
was testimonial.42 According to the Court, the shift from “What 
is happening?” to “What happened?” seemed to define whether 
the statement should be regarded as applying to an ongoing 
emergency (nontestimonial) or as building a case record for fu-
ture prosecution (testimonial).43 
The test for whether scientific evidence could be admitted 
without the analyst being present for cross-examination was 
addressed in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.44 The prosecu-
tion introduced sworn reports of forensic analyses from a state 
laboratory45 certifying that the material seized from the de-
fendant was cocaine.46 Consistent with Massachusetts law, the 
analyst was not called to testify by the prosecution47 and was 
not subpoenaed by the defense.48 The Court split 4-1-4 with 
Justice Thomas concurring.49 While Crawford caused concern 
about the extent of the confrontation right, Melendez-Diaz 
seemed to imply that all hearsay exceptions violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses. The four-member plu-
rality held that the subpoena power does not rehabilitate the 
confrontation right.50 That is to say, the defendant’s ability to 
compel the analyst’s presence did not excuse the prosecution’s 
failure to produce initial testimony, since the prosecution, not 
                                                          
 40. See id. (“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the pri-
mary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”). 
 41. Id. at 818. 
 42. Id. at 830 (explaining that statements to police deliberately recount-
ing how past events progressed are “inherently testimonial” because “they do 
precisely what a witness does on direct examination.” (footnote omitted)). 
 43. Id. (“When the officer questioned [the witness] for the second time, 
and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to deter-
mine . . . ‘what is happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’”). 
 44. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 45. Id. at 307–08. 
 46. Id. at 308. 
 47. Id. at 309. 
 48. Only the reports of the analyst were introduced at trial; the analyst 
did not give live testimony. See id. 
 49. Id. at 306. 
 50. Id. at 324 (plurality opinion). 
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the defendant, bears the burden of proof.51 Further, it was not 
clear what a “testimonial” statement was,52 or to what extent 
such statements would be excluded.53 The plurality did agree 
that maintenance records were likely exempt from the confron-
tation right.54 Justice Thomas’s crucial concurrence was based 
primarily on the sworn nature of the test results introduced in-
to evidence.55 This case was subject to significant dispute by 
both state and federal courts.56 
 
 
                                                          
 51. Id. (“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution 
to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses 
into court.”). 
 52. Justice Thomas gave his own definition, which has not been adopted 
by any of the other justices. Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Con-
frontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as 
they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”). 
 53. Id. at 311 n.1 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e do not hold, and it is not the 
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain 
of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must 
appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”). However, neither this nor 
subsequent decisions have established who must testify. 
 54. Id. (“Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of 
equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.”); see also 
supra note 38 (citing similar language from Crawford). 
 55. Id. at 330 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 56. See, e.g., Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 111–12 (1st Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 225 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Okorie, 
425 F. App’x 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 
636 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Ali, 616 F.3d 745, 752 (8th Cir. 2010); Flournoy v. Small, 681 F.3d 
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1224–25 
(10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Green, 396 F. App’x 573, 574–75 (11th Cir. 
2010); State v. Gomez, 244 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Ariz. 2010); Pendergrass v. State, 
913 N.E.2d 703, 707–08 (Ind. 2009); Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854–55 
(Fla. 2009); Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009); State v. Fitzwater, 
227 P.3d 520, 528 (Haw. 2010); People v. Williams, 238 Ill.2d 125, 142–58 
(2010); State v. Appleby, 221 P.3d 525, 550–52 (Kan. 2009); State v. Simmons, 
78 So. 3d 743, 745–48 (La. 2011); Com. v. Barbosa, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106–08 
(Mass. 2010); State v. Gilman, 993 A.2d 14, 24 (Me. 2010); People v. Nunley, 
821 N.W.2d 642, 652–56 (Mich. 2012); Wilson v. State, 21 So. 3d 572, 588 
(Miss. 2009); State v. Britt, 813 N.W.2d 434, 537–38 (Neb. 2012); State v. Dil-
boy, 999 A.2d 1092, 1101–06 (N.H. 2010); State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 7–
10 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011); People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 
930–33 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Erwin, 26 A.3d 1, 8–9 (Vt. 2011); Aguilar v. Com., 
699 S.E.2d 215, 218–23 (Va. 2010). 
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The next case in this line is Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
which was decided 5-4 in 2011.57 In a case highly similar to 
Melendez-Diaz, the Court found that the state’s failure to pro-
duce the analyst who evaluated the defendant’s blood alcohol 
content violated the Confrontation Clause.58 The substitution of 
the in-court testimony of another analyst from the same lab 
was not an effective cure for this lack of opportunity to confront 
the analyst who actually conducted the test and wrote the re-
port.59 The problem in this case was that the analyst had been 
placed on administrative leave for reasons not revealed by the 
prosecution.60 The prosecution’s surprise decision to substitute 
another analyst denied the defendant the opportunity to in-
quire into the basis for the analyst’s unavailability.61 However, 
the defendant failed to raise this issue on appeal.62 The four 
dissenting justices emphasized the negative impact that the 
Melendez-Diaz standard had on criminal prosecutions.63 The 
deciding vote again came from Justice Thomas, whose concerns 
about the formality of the affidavits were the deciding factor as 
to whether the report was testimonial.64 
 
                                                          
 57. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 58. Id. at 2709–10. 
 59. Id. at 2710 (“We hold that surrogate testimony . . . does not meet the 
constitutional requirement.”). 
 60. Id. at 2711–12. 
 61. See Brief of Petitioner at 31, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) (“When petitioner’s attorney asked the surrogate 
why the actual analyst was placed on unpaid leave, the surrogate replied that 
he did not know. . . . This lack of personal knowledge prevented petitioner 
from discovering whether the analyst who purportedly determined that his 
BAC was over legal limits had been disciplined for erroneous or fraudulent 
work.” (citation omitted)). 
 62. State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d on 
other grounds, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (“We note 
that although Defendant argued in the district court that the witness’s testi-
mony should have been excluded because of late disclosure, Defendant does 
not raise that ground as a basis for reversal on appeal.”). 
 63. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[The majori-
ty] once more assumes for itself a central role in mandating detailed eviden-
tiary rules, thereby extending and confirming Melendez-Diaz’s ‘vast potential 
to disrupt criminal procedures.’” (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))). 
 64. Justice Thomas did not write a separate opinion in this case, but other 
justices discussed the formality of the affidavits in question. Cf. id. at 2721 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The formality inherent in the certification fur-
ther suggests its evidentiary purpose.”). 
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In the 2011 case of Michigan v. Bryant,65 the Court held in 
a 6-1-2 decision that ten minutes of police questioning of a 
shooting victim was not testimonial, but was in response to an 
ongoing emergency and was therefore admissible.66 This hold-
ing suggested a limit to the nature of police questioning consid-
ered nontestimonial, as introduced in Davis. In their dissent, 
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia denounced this notion as a fiction, 
finding that the officers were clearly building a record for pros-
ecution, and therefore, the statements were testimonial.67 Sur-
prisingly, this case did not address the issue of the traditional 
dying declaration hearsay exception,68 one of the oldest and 
most intuitive hearsay exceptions,69 because the state did not 
include it on appeal.70 
In 2012, the Court issued Williams v. Illinois in another 4-
1-4 split decision.71 In this case, testimony was admitted under 
a traditional expert witness approach.72 Consistent with both 
the Illinois and Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert witness is 
permitted to base his or her professional opinion on materials 
generally accepted in the field.73 In this case, a state laboratory 
                                                          
 65. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 66. Id. at 1166–67 (holding that this statement was not barred by the 
Confrontation Clause because the circumstances and actions of those involved 
indicated that the “primary purpose” of police in obtaining the statement was 
emergency response (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006))). 
 67. Id. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The five officers interrogated Cov-
ington primarily to investigate past criminal events.”). 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). But see Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 
(2008) (“We have previously acknowledged that two forms of testimonial 
statements were admitted at common law . . . . The first of these were declara-
tions made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and aware that 
he was dying.”). 
 69. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed 
Rules (“The exception is the familiar dying declaration of the common law, ex-
panded somewhat beyond its traditionally narrow limits. While the original 
religious justification for the exception may have lost its conviction for some 
persons over the years, it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological 
pressures are present.”). 
 70. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 71. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). Justice Alito wrote the 
plurality with Justice Breyer concurring and Justice Thomas concurring sepa-
rately, while Justice Kagan wrote the four-justice dissent. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2228 (plurality opinion) (“For more than 200 years, the law of 
evidence has permitted the sort of testimony that was given by the expert in 
this case.”). 
 73. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (“The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or 
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employee testified that the DNA profile generated by an inde-
pendent lab “matched” a profile of the defendant.74 In doing so, 
she expressed her independent opinion as to the validity of her 
own work.75 The expert also testified that the business records 
showed the DNA sample had been sent to an outside lab and 
received back from the same lab.76 The plurality went further 
and would reverse the prior findings in Melendez-Diaz, stating 
that “[t]his conclusion will not prejudice any defendant who re-
ally wishes to probe the reliability of the DNA testing done in a 
particular case because those who participated in the testing 
may always be subpoenaed by the defense and questioned at 
trial.”77 
The Court distinguished Williams from Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, because the lab reports and affidavit were intro-
duced into evidence in those cases. In Williams, the lab report 
was not introduced but was instead referenced by the expert as 
a source for forming her expert opinion.78  The expert per-
formed the ‘match’ independently of the lab report,79 which 
simply generated the profile. It would be overreaching to read 
this as a jurisprudential change by the Court. This decision is 
best reconciled by the recognition of two opposing blocks of four 
justices each: one block holds that the Sixth Amendment con-
frontation right applies to scientific evidence and requires live 
                                                          
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably re-
lied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”); see 
also ILL. R. EVID. 703 (using the same language). 
 74. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230 (plurality opinion) (“Lambatos then testi-
fied that, based on her own comparison of the two DNA profiles, she ‘concluded 
that [petitioner] cannot be excluded as a possible source of the semen identi-
fied in the vaginal swabs,’ and that the probability of the profile’s appearing in 
the general population was ‘1 in 8.7 quadrillion black, 1 in 390 quadrillion 
white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals.’ . . . Asked 
whether she would ‘call this a match to [petitioner],’ Lambatos answered yes, 
again over defense counsel’s objection.”). 
 75. Id. at 2230. 
 76. Id. at 2227. 
 77. Id. at 2228. But see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 
324 (2009) (“But [the ability to subpoena the analysts]—whether pursuant to 
state law or the Compulsory Process Clause—is no substitute for the right of 
confrontation.”). 
 78. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230 (“The Cellmark report itself was neither 
admitted into evidence nor shown to the fact finder. Lambatos did not quote or 
read from the report; nor did she identify it as the source of any of the opinions 
she expressed.”). 
 79. Id. at 2229. 
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testimony of analysts;80 the other block holds that the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply to scientific evidence and analysts’ 
reports are admissible without live testimony.81 The crucial 
vote in these cases is Justice Thomas, whose view of admissibil-
ity is dependent on the formality of the testimonial document, a 
view shared by neither block.82 
B. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM 
Scientific evidence is a new development in criminal law.83 
Despite the notion of the scientific detective of the Sherlock 
Holmes novels,84 the science of forensics has only recently come 
into practical, widespread use with the commercial availability 
of analytical chemistry tools.85 University programs in forensic 
                                                          
 80. This block includes Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
who dissented in Williams. See id. at 2264–77. 
 81. This block includes Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Brey-
er, and Alito, who constituted the plurality in Williams. See id. at 2227–45. 
 82. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329–30 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Justice continues to “adhere to 
[his] position” that the Confrontation Clause is implicated only by “formalized 
testimonial materials” (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 83. Paul C. Giannelli describes the phenomenon: 
Neutron activation analysis, sound spectrometry (voiceprints), psy-
cholinguistics, atomic absorption, remote electromagnetic sensing, 
and bitemark comparisons are but a sample of the kinds of scientific 
evidence inundating the courts. In addition, prior rulings on the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence have been challenged. In some cases, 
previously rejected techniques, such as polygraph and hypnotic evi-
dence, have gained admissibility. In other cases, some well-accepted 
scientific techniques, such as radar and certain drug-testing proce-
dures, have been challenged successfully. 
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. Unit-
ed States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1198–99 (1980). 
 84. In Mike Grost’s words: 
While Golden Age mystery fiction largely shows little interest in sci-
ence, perhaps the majority of detective stories of the Doyle era paid 
tribute to science and technology. Science was in fact part of the very 
genre of detective fiction, in many people’s eyes. Some authors, such 
as Doyle, emphasized scientific crime detection. Sherlock Holmes was 
a chemist, and did lab analysis of physical clues. 
Mike Grost, Scientific Detectives, MIKEGROST.COM, http://mikegrost.com/   
moffett.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
 85. Mass Spectroscopy for proteins was available as early as 1958. See 
Carl-Ove Andersson, Mass Spectrometric Studies on Amino Acid and Peptide 
Derivatives, 12 ACTA CHEMICA SCANDINAVICA 1353, 1353 (1958). Fourier 
Transform Infrared was available in 1957. See The Infracord Double Beam 
Spectrophotometer, 16 CLINICAL SCI. 3, 3 (1957). The first commercial Scan-
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chemistry have been available since 1976.86 The first blood al-
cohol measurement was performed in 1927,87 with courts ac-
cepting the data as early as 1951.88 The first field breathalyzer 
was invented in 1954.89 In 1988, the first genetic testing was 
used in court.90 The question of whether this evidence would be 
sufficiently reliable to avoid triggering the Confrontation 
Clause was not addressed by the Founding Fathers.91 It is a 
                                                          
ning Electron Microscope (SEM) by Cambridge Scientific Instrument Compa-
ny was the Stereoscan in 1965. P. J. Breton, From Microns to Nanometers: 
Early Landmarks in the Science of Scanning Electron Microscope Imaging, 13 
SCANNING MICROSCOPY 1, 2 (1999). Nuclear magnetic resonance was first de-
scribed and measured in molecular beams by Isidor Rabi in 1938. I. Rabi et al., 
A New Method of Measuring Nuclear Magnetic Moment, 53 PHYSICAL REV. 
318, 318 (1938). The precursor to the High Pressure Liquid Chromatography 
was invented in 1941. Martin and Synge demonstrated the potential of the 
methods by separating amino acids marked in the column by the addition of 
methyl orange. Archer J. P. Martin, The Development of Partition Chromatog-
raphy in NOBEL LECTURES, CHEMISTRY 1942–62, at 359–71 (1964). 
 86. See, e.g., About Our Program, OHIO UNIVERSITY, http://www.ohio.edu/ 
chemistry/forensic/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (“Our [Forensic Science Educa-
tion Programs Accreditation  Commission]-accredited BS Forensic Chemistry 
Degree was created in 1976 by Dr. James Y. Tong, a faculty member in Chem-
istry and Biochemistry at Ohio University. We are one of the longest-standing 
programs of its kind in the country, possibly the oldest.”). 
 87. See Emil Bogen, The Diagnosis of Drunkenness—A Quantitative Study 
of Acute Alcoholic Intoxication, 26 CAL. W. MED. 778, 778 (1927). 
 88. See, e.g., Greenwood v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 996, 998 (W.D. Ky. 
1951) (“Following the collision between the truck and the taxicab, Rayno was 
taken into custody by the Military Authorities and at 2:15 P.M., an alcoholic 
blood test was made in the laboratory at Fort Knox. The test was described as 
the ‘Nicloux Method’ [sic], in which it was determined that there were 3.0 mil-
ligrams of alcohol per cubic centimeter of blood.”). 
 89. History of the Center for Studies of Law in Action and the Borkenstein 
Course, BORKENSTEIN COURSE, http://www.borkensteincourse.org/history/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2013). Though technologies for detecting alcohol vary, it 
is widely accepted that Dr. Robert Borkenstein, a captain with the Indiana 
State Police and later a professor at Indiana University at Bloomington, is re-
garded as the first to create a device that measures a subject’s blood alcohol 
level based on a breath sample. Id. In 1954, Borkenstein invented his Breatha-
lyzer, which used chemical oxidation and photometry to determine alcohol 
concentration. D.M. Lucas, Professor Robert F. Borkenstein—An Appreciation 
of His Life and Work, 12 FORENSIC SCI. REV., Jan. 2000, at 1, 9. 
 90. The DNA Fingerprint and Criminal Evidence, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE 
NAT’L LABORATORY, http://education.llnl.gov/bep/socsci/11/tEvi.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 16, 2013) (“In 1988 the DNA fingerprint was first admitted as evi-
dence in court in the case of Florida v. Tommy Lee Andrews.”). 
 91. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 344 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (“The Framers were concerned with a typical witness—one who per-
ceived an event that gave rise to a personal belief in some aspect of the de-
fendant’s guilt. There is no evidence that the Framers understood the Clause 
to extend to unconventional witnesses.”). 
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new question, created by modern technologies. Scientific evi-
dence in federal and state courts is controlled by two key deci-
sions: Frye v. United States92 and Daubert v. Dow.93 
Frye is a venerable and respected test from 1923, with a 
decision about a page in length—a feature that no doubt in-
creased its attractiveness to readers. Frye concerned the admis-
sibility of a “systolic blood pressure” lie detector test.94 The 
court stated that the standard for admissibility is that the un-
derlying method “must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs.”95 The court recognized the difficulty in determining 
when something passed from experimental to widely-accepted96 
but emphasized the necessity of keeping speculative, unestab-
lished science out of the courtroom.97 This “general acceptance” 
standard was widely adopted and remains good law in several 
states.98 
In the federal courts, Daubert replaced Frye in 1993. In 
Daubert, the district court had granted summary judgment 
against the plaintiff’s evidence of birth defects resulting from 
the mother’s use of an anti-nausea drug.99 Though the evidence 
was presented by eight expert witnesses, the finding was not 
generally accepted within the scientific community and the tri-
al court rejected plaintiff’s evidence.100 This ruling was af-
                                                          
 92. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 93. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 94. Frye, 293 F. at 1013. 
 95. Id. at 1014. 
 96. Id. (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized.”). 
 97. See id. (“We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not 
yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and 
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testi-
mony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far 
made.”). 
 98. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? 
A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472 (2005) 
(“Although the practical effects of Daubert were initially ambiguous, the en-
during legacy of the Daubert decision is now relatively clear. In federal courts, 
where the decision is legally binding, Daubert has become a potent weapon of 
tort reform by causing judges to scrutinize scientific evidence more closely.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 99. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993). 
 100. Id. 
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firmed by the appellate court, which cited Frye as supporting 
the proposition that “expert opinion based on a scientific tech-
nique is inadmissible unless the technique is generally accept-
ed as reliable in the relevant scientific community.”101 The Su-
preme Court overruled Frye 7-2, finding that promulgation of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702, had elimi-
nated the federal common law of evidence.102 
The Court then outlined what became known as the Daub-
ert standard governing the admissibility of scientific evidence: 
1) the method must be capable of objective testing (i.e., falsifia-
bility);103 2) the method should have been subject to peer re-
viewed publication;104 3) the known or potential error rate has 
been considered;105 4) the existence of standards and controls is 
considered;106 and 5) the general acceptance in the relevant sci-
entific community is considered.107 While Frye focused on novel 
scientific applications, the holding in Daubert applied to exist-
ing scientific methods as well.108 
C. CROSS-EXAMINATION EXAMINED 
According to the Court, the purpose of confrontation is 
threefold; it: 
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—thus 
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding 
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the 
witness to submit to cross-examination, the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth; (3) permits the jury that is to de-
cide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in  
 
 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). 
 102. Id. at 589 (holding the Frye standard is “incompatible with . . . the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, [and] should not be applied in federal trials.”). 
 103. Id. at 593. 
 104. Id. at 594 (“The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed 
journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in as-
sessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on 
which an opinion is premised.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 592 n.11 (“Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively 
on ‘novel’ scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to 
apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-
established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are 
novel, and they are more handily defended.”). 
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making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibil-
ity.109 
While these three purposes clearly justify confrontation in the 
case of traditional witnesses, their relevance to producers of 
scientific evidence is dubious. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether an oath actually im-
pacts modern witnesses’ willingness to lie,110 the statements re-
jected by the Court in Melendez-Diaz were affidavits sworn in 
front of a notary public.111 The report in Bullcoming was reject-
ed despite containing no sworn oath.112 However, scientific evi-
dence, especially the result of an analytical test, is an objective, 
not subjective, determination. Furthermore, the results of the 
testing, including the detection of errors, can frequently be ver-
ified from raw data in reports, such as those measuring blood 
alcohol level113 or analyzing DNA.114 
Lawyers love the idea that, like Perry Mason, they can fer-
ret out duplicity with a well-timed question during cross-
examination. The facts, on the other hand, speak clearly.115 
                                                          
 109. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Cf. Trevor S. Harding et al., Does Academic Dishonesty Relate to Un-
ethical Behavior in Professional Practice? An Exploratory Study, 10 SCI. & 
ENGINEERING ETHICS 311 (2004) (finding high school cheating correlated with 
professional dishonesty). 
 111. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009). 
 112. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011) (noting 
that the report was “unsworn” but otherwise “[i]n all material respects, the 
laboratory report in this case resemble[d] those in Melendez-Diaz”). 
 113. See Brief of the Amicus Curiae State of New Mexico Department of 
Health Scientific Laboratory Division in Support of Respondent at 15, Bull-
coming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) (“The fact that 
the BAC.M method is used can easily be verified because most, if not all, of 
this and the other information the amici state they cannot obtain without 
cross-examining the analyst is actually shown on the GC print-out. See Ap-
pendices C & D, attached, a run-of-the-mill SLD BAC result print-out and the 
related chromatogram which the print-out describes numerically.”). 
 114. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2231 (2012) (“Lambatos also 
noted that the data making up the DNA profile would exhibit certain telltale 
signs if it had been deduced from a degraded sample: The visual representa-
tion of the DNA sequence would exhibit ‘specific patterns’ of degradation, and 
she ‘didn’t see any evidence’ of that from looking at the profile that Cellmark 
produced.”). 
 115. Cf. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1167 
(1991) (“Effective cross-examination is a powerful tool. It does not work won-
ders; in particular, it is not an effective technique to force a lying witness to 
admit the truth.”); Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, 
Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. 
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There have been zero documented instances where cross-
examination produced disclosure of scientific malfeasance.116 In 
their study of false convictions, Garrett and Neufeld found that 
“[d]efense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning 
invalid testimony and rarely retained experts, since courts rou-
tinely deny funding for defense experts.”117 
The truth is that it is difficult for experts to detect scien-
tific fraud in reports from a single data set, even with the raw 
test results. Some methods do exist for detecting fabricated or 
“drylabbed” data, such as evaluating the frequencies of various 
digits118 or evaluating deviations and variations in the control 
sample gaps.119 Larger data sets are amenable to distribution 
and error analysis which are rarely options when considering a 
single test.120 However, detection of scientific fakery generally 
requires analysis of a set or series of tests to generate enough 
data points.121 The reason again is simple; most people who de-
cide to fake data recycle portions of their reports to save time 
                                                          
REV. 727, 772 (2007) (“Most significantly, the book iterates that there will be 
no ‘knock-out punch’ in cross-examination resulting in an admission that the 
witness is wrong.” (citing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, at § 10-2 (3d ed. 1997))). 
 116. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250 (citing David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s 
Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 73 (2009)). In their study of 220 exonerat-
ed felons, “Garrett and Neufeld did not identify any cases in which hearsay 
from forensic analysts contributed to the conviction of innocent defendants.” 
David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 73 (2009). 
See also Gross, supra note 115, at 1172 (“Since experts are more likely than 
lay witnesses to have spent a great deal of time preparing for cross-
examination, they have a better chance of anticipating and thwarting the 
cross-examiner’s intentions. In addition, unlike most lay witnesses, many ex-
perts are repeat performers who have learnt from past experiences what ques-
tions to expect on cross-examination and how to take advantage of any open-
ings.”). 
 117. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Tes-
timony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009). 
 118. T. W. Beer, Terminal Digit Preference: Beware of Benford’s Law, 62 J. 
CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 192, 192 (2009); Dominique Geyer, Detecting Fraud in 
Financial Data Sets, 8 J. BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH 75, 75 (2010); Bassam Has-
san, Examining Data Accuracy and Authenticity with Leading Digit Frequency 
Analysis, 103 INDUST. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 121,121–25 (2003). 
 119. Peter Brugger, Variables that Influence the Generation of Random Se-
quences: An Update, 84 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 627, 627 (1997); Theo-
dore P. Hill, Random-Number Guessing and the First Digit Phenomenon, 62 
PSYCHOL. REP. 967, 967 (1988) (“If people are asked to generate random num-
bers, their responses differ significantly from truly random sequences . . . .”). 
 120. Theodore P. Hill, The Difficulty of Faking Data, 12 CHANCE, no. 3, 
1999, at 27, 27. 
 121. Geyer, supra note 118. 
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and effort.122 This is because generating realistic fake raw data 
requires the hard work of matching the natural random distri-
bution of the data type.123 The only way this type of malfea-
sance will be detected is by careful examination of the raw da-
ta,124 or by repetition of the testing.125 
Witness reliability or credibility is the third criteria identi-
fied by the Court in Green. However, this is another example of 
theory not interacting with the real world. In the courtroom, 
testimony by a scientific witness is based on review of the con-
tent of the witness’s report, not his memories.126 The Federal 
Rules of Evidence have a clear hearsay exception for such tes-
timony, the recorded recollection, defined as 
[a] record that: (A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but 
now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately; (B) was 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the 
witness’s memory; and (C) accurately reflects the witness’s 
knowledge. If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may 
be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.127 
While rare individuals exhibit exceptional recall of trivial or 
mundane events,128 most people do not recall the minutia of 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 77. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Brief of the Amicus Curiae State of New Mexico Department of 
Health Scientific Laboratory Division in Support of Respondent, supra note 
113, at 25 (“If a problem can be detected from the data, the analyst testifying 
at trial is effectively acting as an additional reviewer on the case.”). Indeed, 
this is supported by the dissent’s position in Williams where a reviewer found 
an error in another original report from Cellmark: “But after undergoing 
cross-examination, the analyst realized she had made a mortifying error. She 
took the stand again, but this time to admit that the report listed the victim’s 
control sample as coming from Kocak, and Kocak’s as coming from the victim.” 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Note 
that the recognition did not come in cross examination or even as a result of 
cross examination but by review of the report. 
 125. Cf. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2013) (providing a count of U.S. post-conviction DNA exonerations; 
the number as of April 28, 2013, was 306); Epstein, supra note 117, at 729–30 
(“According to the Innocence Project, sixty-one of the first seventy DNA-
exoneration cases involved mistaken identification testimony.”). 
 126. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 341 (2009) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (“The analyst must instead face the prospect of waiting for days 
in a hallway outside the courtroom before being called to offer testimony that 
will consist of little more than a rote recital of the written report.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 127. FED. R. EVID. 803(5). 
 128. But see Brief of the Amicus Curiae State of New Mexico Department of 
Health Scientific Laboratory Division in Support of Respondent, supra note 
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their day-to-day work activities.129 This is why scientists use 
laboratory notebooks, logs, and reports. It is not reasonable to 
expect a scientific witness to reliably testify to more than the 
contents of their recently reviewed report.130 Unless there is 
something unusual, and a note was made on their report, the 
odds that any additional details will be recalled are negligible. 
Such witnesses are unlikely to spontaneously decide they have 
been performing their work sloppily, recall an inadvertent er-
ror, or confess to malfeasance any more than other types of ex-
pert witnesses.131 The profound disjunction of this reality from 
our expectations underscores the problem with the current con-
frontation requirement. As one article noted, “In sum, the reli-
ance of courts on the power of cross-examination, both on its 
own and as a sufficient substitute for expert testimony, has no 
support in the literature.”132 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia boldly states “[r]eliability is an 
amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.”133 Certainly in 
the context of traditional witness testimony, especially eyewit-
ness testimony, there are no clear rules to separate truth from 
fiction. But in the realm of science, Justice Scalia’s statement is 
clearly wrong; reliability is a measurable quantity. A reliable 
method is repeatable, meaning its output has low variation 
compared with the separation between positive and negative 
results.134 This implies the method has a low error rate, since 
                                                          
113, at 27 (“The kind of photographic memory that would be required to re-
member all of the numbered vials one has tested over the course of a year 
would be so remarkable as to strain credulity.”). 
 129. Id. at 26 (“Petitioner gives the impression that he thinks a run of 
blood test vials may be limited to a dozen samples at a time. . . . Not so. Each 
batch consists of about 40 to 60 samples identified only by a computer-
generated number. . . . Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions . . . it 
would be unbelievable for an analyst to say they remember any particular run, 
or the region from which that sample came.”). 
 130. Id. at 28 n.10 (“The [National Association of Criminal Defense Lay-
wers] amici raise the unusual test which may, ‘in their experience’ be remem-
bered. . . . Anything unusual must be documented in the individual’s file per 
SLD SOPs and policy. . . . If the analyst didn’t think it was unusual enough to 
note, he or she is unlikely to remember, or associate it with, any particular 
sample tested.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 131. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 339 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is not 
plausible that a laboratory analyst will retract his or her prior conclusion upon 
catching sight of the defendant the result condemns.”). 
 132. Epstein, supra note 115, at 774. 
 133. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
 134. Screening tests are designed to have a low false negative rate, while 
verification tests are designed to have a low false positive rate. Some tests 
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positive and negative outcomes are clearly differentiated. Reli-
ability is generally reported in a measure that allows calcula-
tion of the frequency of false test results, with 99.7% reliability 
being a frequently used minimum for practical applications.135 
For criminal cases where innocence or guilt is to be decided, 
why should we accept less reliability from the methods we 
choose to employ? 
D. TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE 
The traditional gold standard of evidence in criminal con-
victions is victim testimony.136 After all, what could be more re-
liable than the report of the victim of the crime?137 However 
over the past few decades, research has shown that factors ju-
ries and judges view as relevant do not correlate with factors 
that indicate reliable testimony.138 A majority of the wrongful 
convictions exposed by subsequent DNA testing have involved 
                                                          
may perform only one function or the other. Other tests can be used for either 
purpose, depending on the threshold selected. See Mark H. Zweig & Gregory 
Campbell, Receiver-Operating Characteristic (ROC) Plots: A Fundamental 
Evaluation Tool in Clinical Medicine, 39 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 561, 561 
(1993). 
 135. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scien-
tific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 486 (1990) 
(“[M]ost scientific studies . . . declare two standard deviations to be statistical-
ly significant,” this corresponds to  ninety-five percent reliability). 
 136. Britton Douglas, “That’s What She Said”: Why Limiting the Use of Un-
corroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony Could Prevent Wrongful 
Convictions in Texas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 561, 574 (“[T]he criminal justice 
system relies heavily on eyewitness testimony, as it is often the foundation of 
the prosecution’s case and sometimes the only basis for proving guilt.”). 
 137. Edward Radin references a federal judge who estimates a five percent 
error rate in serious criminal trials. EDWARD RADIN, THE INNOCENTS 8–9 
(1964). But see Epstein, supra note 115, at 734 (“In about 23% of the 21,621 
[rape] cases, DNA test results excluded suspects [identified by eyewitness tes-
timony].”). 
 138. Sklansky, supra note 116, at 74 (“For example, evidence has been ac-
cumulating for almost a century that eyewitness identifications are far less 
reliable than jurors (and many judges) tend to think they are, that they are 
prone to certain predictable forms of error, and that cross-examination offers 
limited protection against these risks. The evidence has grown much more 
compelling over the past few decades, partly because of a steadily growing 
body of research by experimental psychologists.”). See also Epstein, supra note 
115, at 740–41 (“Kassin’s accumulation of studies and search for consensus 
make clear that, whether applying the Frye or Daubert standard for admitting 
expert testimony, the methodology and conclusions of these experts [on the 
limitations of eyewitnesses] are sufficiently reliable to be admissible in court.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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erroneous eyewitness testimony, against which cross-
examination proved ineffective.139 It is well established that 
people have challenges identifying people of other racial back-
grounds,140 when under stress,141 or when threatened with a 
weapon.142 
Traditional evidence requires cross-examination to estab-
lish its reliability. Cross-examination allows the defense to es-
tablish bad lighting, stress, the absence of glasses, rain, or oth-
er factors that would compromise the witness in the eyes of the 
jury.143 Yet despite strong evidence of the dangers of eyewitness 
testimony144 and the ineffectiveness of its cross-examination, 
the courts still allow its introduction, often without limiting in-
structions. None of these circumstantial factors are relevant to 
a scientific test result produced as part of an analyst’s day-to-
day activity in a lab. 
The unreliability of traditional evidence is reconciled with 
the conviction rate by examining jurors’ and potential jurors’ 
understanding of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” “[L]egal com-
mentators have estimated the mathematical level of guilt to 
mean more than ninety percent certainty . . . .”145 In contrast, 
jurors tend to view beyond reasonable doubt at a lesser per-
centage.146 While a district attorney may be able to convince a 
grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich,”147 juries have shown a  
 
                                                          
 139. Epstein, supra note 115, at 729–30 (“According to the Innocence Pro-
ject, sixty-one of the first seventy DNA-exoneration cases involved mistaken 
identification testimony.”). 
 140. Id. at 739; Sklansky, supra note 116, at 74–75. 
 141. Epstein, supra note 115, at 738. 
 142. Id. at 736. 
 143. See id. at 728 (“Courts have specifically focused upon cross-
examination as a sufficient tool for addressing and uncovering mistaken iden-
tifications.”). 
 144. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 117, at 25 (2009) (“As noted, several of 
these trials [with false eyewitness identifications] involved forensic evidence—
in a few cases DNA evidence—that excluded the defendant, and yet the state 
still secured the conviction.”). 
 145. Podlas, supra note 27, at 436. 
 146. Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the 
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 113–16 (2002) (finding juror 
requirements for conviction ranging from 0.525 to 0.8 probability of guilt). 
 147. Former New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Sol Wachtler was fa-
mously quoted by Tom Wolfe as saying that “a grand jury would ‘indict a ham 
sandwich,’ if that’s what you wanted.” TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE 
VANITIES 624 (1987). 
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willingness to convict even in the face of forensic evidence to 
the contrary.148 
E. TAINTED SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
While scientific data generally has greater reliability than 
traditional witness-based evidence, this does not excuse the 
admission of bad data into the courts. The Daubert factors 
identify what types of scientific evidence are appropriate for 
admission.149 Despite the clear expectations outlined in that 
decision, courts continue to accept scientific evidence that has 
not been subject to the rigors of peer review, method validation, 
and error measurement.150 The affidavit in Melendez-Diaz is a 
prime example of this type of problem. It failed to identify the 
test method used to determine that the seized material was co-
caine;151 it failed to identify the error rate for that test meth-
od;152 it failed to state whether or not that particular test meth-
od had been subject to peer review;153 and it failed to state 
whether any standards or controls had been run as part of the 
testing.154 In short, the affidavit did not meet the Daubert 
standard. 
Professor Mark Stevens at California State University 
Fresno identifies the following methods as having passed 
Daubert-type scrutiny: DNA evidence, spectrophotometer and 
gas chromatographic hair analysis for drug use, intoxilyzer 
tests, handwriting analysis (although generally not required to 
                                                          
 148. Cf. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 117, at 15 (“Of the 55 cases in which 
all [forensic] testimony was valid, 22 contained the testimony of forensic ana-
lysts who presented only evidence that was non-probative (13 cases) or excul-
patory (11).”). 
 149. For a list of the Daubert factors, see supra notes 103–07 and accom-
panying text. 
 150. Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert 
Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1994) (“Nevertheless, forensic tests and 
techniques have in the past made their way into the courtroom only to disap-
pear after being discredited.”). 
 151. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305 (2008) (No. 07-591) (“They do not identify the testing method the analysts 
used to arrive at their conclusions or describe any difficulties (and accompany-
ing error rates) associated with the particular method(s) the analysts used to 
test for cocaine.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (explaining that the reports contained “largely conclusory” 
statements from the analysts). 
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exhibit Daubert reliability), and newer studies on poly-
graphs.155 In contrast, many commonly accepted techniques 
have generally failed to meet the Daubert criteria: ballistics, 
computer simulations, eyewitness identification, hypnosis for 
memory recollection, psychiatric profiling and checklist style 
disorder diagnosis, trace evidence comparison, and voice com-
parison.156 Compliance with Daubert does not avoid problems 
like the one in Bullcoming, where the underlying scientific pro-
cess may have been compromised.157 In such cases, the judge 
should deny admission of the report or testimony on it as the 
evidence is not reliably relevant to the determination of a ma-
terial fact of issue in the case.158 Such evidence, due to its erro-
neously perceived reliability, will also have a great tendency to 
mislead the jury.159 
It is not unreasonable to expect the agents of the court, in-
cluding prosecutors and judges, to fulfill their duty of candor.160 
That duty includes notification of the court in the event evi-
dence is found to be tainted due to actual or procedural er-
rors.161 Alternately, the prosecution could be required to affirm 
that the state is unaware of any information that would poten-
tially compromise the validity of the report as part of the foun-
dational requirement for admission. Similarly, the prosecution 
has a duty to notify the court and defense of its intended wit-
nesses in a timely manner.162 It is well established that failure 
                                                          
 155. Mark Stevens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 
N.C. WESLEYAN C., http://faculty.ncwc.edu/mstevens/425/lecture02.htm (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2711–12 (2011). 
 158. FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . . .”). 
 159. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 160. This is naïve. However, if judicial officers and prosecutors will not ob-
serve the law, then fundamentally no arguments about procedure matter in 
the slightest. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, at r. 3.3 (2012) (“Candor 
toward the tribunal. (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false state-
ment of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material 
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer . . . .”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (failure to disclose substitute expert witness’ 
statement is grounds for exclusion of testimony). 
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to do so may be grounds for exclusion.163 In Bullcoming, it is 
clear that the defense counsel only became aware of the irregu-
larity with regard to the analyst at trial.164 However, at trial 
the defendant did not contest his intoxication at the time of the 
test, instead claiming that he had consumed vodka between the 
accident and his detention by the police shortly thereafter.165 At 
the time of trial, the state failed to provide evidence that the 
suspension was unrelated to the technical performance of the 
analyst’s work.166 If unable to cure this defect, the state would 
then need to present the analyst, rerun the testing with anoth-
er analyst, or drop the report from the case. 
II. MEETING THE DAUBERT CRITERIA 
A. COMPLETE SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 
A well-drafted, technical report should answer all of the 
questions that would be asked of the analyst.167 While some re-
ports, like the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz,168 are simply bald 
assertions, others, like the Bullcoming report,169 are not orga-
nized to allow a judge (or other non-expert reviewer) to deter-
mine whether all of the necessary elements are present. These  
 
                                                          
 163. Id. 
 164. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2711–12 (2011) (“The 
prosecution, [defense counsel] complained, had never disclosed, until trial 
commenced, that the witness ‘out there [was] not the analyst [of the sample at 
issue].’”). 
 165. State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 681 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d on 
other grounds, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 166. Brief of the Amicus Curiae State of New Mexico Department of Health 
Scientific Laboratory Division in Support of Respondent, supra note 113, at 31 
n.11 (“The record reflects that the original analyst, Curtis Caylor, was on un-
paid leave. As an employment matter, SLD [Scientific Lab Division] may not 
disclose the reason, but states unequivocally that if Mr. Caylor’s analytical 
work had been doubted, SLD policy is that it would have been rejected, and re-
tested prior to trial.”). 
 167. See Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 74, 76–78 (Ga. 1996) (discussing how 
indicia of “reliability” in technical reports, including scientific evidence, can 
have an effect on whether or not that evidence is admissible). 
 168. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (discussing 
affidavits submitted as a way to provide “prima facie evidence of the composi-
tion, quality, and the net weight” of a substance that was analyzed as evi-
dence). 
 169. State v. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2011) (discussing blood 
sample reports analyzed by a forensic science analyst). 
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elements, listed below, are discussed in detail in Part II.B 
through II.F. 
Key Components of a Scientific Report: 
1) Sample identifier, including any identifier(s) as-
signed to the sample during analysis. 
2) Documentation of sample receipt and chain of cus-
tody. 
3) Analyst’s name. 
4) Analyst’s credentials.170 
5) Evidence of analyst’s certification or qualification to 
perform the specific test.171 
6) Laboratory’s certification.172 
7) Testing method, either referencing an established 
standard (e.g., ASTM E2224 - 10 Standard Guide 
for Forensic Analysis of Fibers by Infrared Spectros-
copy) or a copy of the method if it is not publicly 
available.173 
8) Evidence of the effectiveness and reliability of the 
method,174 either from peer reviewed journals, 
method certification, or internal validation test-
ing.175 
9) Results of testing, including the results of all 
standards or controls run as part of the testing.176 
10) Copies of all results, figures, graphs, etc. 
11) Copy of the calibration log or certificate for any 
equipment used. 
12) Any observations, deviations, and variances, or an 
affirmative statement that none were observed. 
                                                          
 170. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
 171. See generally id. 
 172. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702(c). 
 173. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
 174. Id. at 594. 
 175. See id.; Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 117, at 93–98. See also Brief of 
Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Ass’n of 
Federal Defenders, and National College of DUI Defense in Support of Peti-
tioners at 12, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2008) (No. 07-
591) (“Since laboratory reports only state general conclusions, they may be 
given far more significance in court than they rightfully deserve.” (quoting 
United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1982)). 
 176. For an example of what this requirement seeks to prevent, see Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2230 (2012) (“[S]he had not seen any of the 
calibrations or work that Cellmark had done in deducing a male DNA profile 
from the vaginal swabs. . . .”). 
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13) Analyst’s statement that all this information is 
true, correct, and complete to the best of their 
knowledge. 
14) Analyst’s statement that the information is con-
sistent with various hearsay exceptions. 
15) Evidence of second-party review, generally a super-
visor or qualified peer. 
16) Posting a copy to a publicly maintained database.177 
17) Notifying the authorizing entity via email of the 
completion of the work and the location of the post-
ing.178 
“Currently, no national or widely-accepted set of standards 
for forensic science written reports or testimony exists.”179 No 
entity ensures that all analysts adhere to standards for permis-
sible scientific conclusions regarding forensic evidence.180 Iden-
tification and standardization of best practices may be an im-
portant step towards producing consistent scientific reports. 
B. IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS 
Proper documentation of sample identification and chain of 
custody allow test results to be tied to a specific piece of evi-
dence submitted by an investigator.181 While it is important 
that the analyst has the proper academic training to perform 
his job, more important is the analyst’s qualification and train-
ing to perform the specific test.182 This should include some 
                                                          
 177. See Gross, supra note 115, at 1172 (“Unfortunately, what an expert 
says in court is generally invisible and inaudible in her own professional 
world. If expert witnesses were accountable to their colleagues, even informal-
ly, they might fear the consequences of irresponsible testimony far more than 
they do. This sort of exposure would be an incentive to be careful as well as 
honest.” (footnote omitted)). 
 178.  See People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 475 (Ill. 2000) (detailing 
how a submitted report does not contain “any information as to how the tests 
are conducted, what the accepted scientific procedures are, and what qualifica-
tions and training crime lab employees must have”). 
 179. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 117, at 11. 
 180. Id. (“No entity promulgates such standards or ensures that all ana-
lysts adhere to standards for permissible scientific conclusions regarding fo-
rensic evidence.”). 
 181. See generally Mike Byrd, Proper Tagging and Labeling of Evidence for 
later Identification, CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATOR NETWORK, http://www.crime-
scene-investigator.net/tagging.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (providing 
brief background of identification and chain of custody labeling used by police). 
 182. See FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
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documented training and evaluation subject to annual or bian-
nual renewals.183 Periodic retraining identifies drifts in perfor-
mance and also areas where the methodology is weak, vague, or 
inconsistently performed.184 Similarly, labs should seek outside 
certification to assure that processes and procedures are con-
sistent with professional norms.185 
C. METHODS CONSISTENT WITH DAUBERT CRITERIA 
Regardless of whether the testimony is presented in person 
or by report, the methodology used in scientific analysis must 
conform to the criteria outlined in Daubert (or Frye in certain 
jurisdictions).186 Most of this material may be incorporated into 
standard templates or remain constant for similar analyses, al-
lowing cutting and pasting by the analyst. The technical esti-
mates of error rate (Item 8) may be developed by professional 
societies.187 If the statement is published in a peer reviewed 
journal or similar source, it may be incorporated by reference, 
although a paragraph summary of the error rate and other key 
pieces of information should be included in the report.188 Fail-
ure to provide such evidence indicates that the report has failed 
to meet the Daubert criteria, since the information required is 
presumptively unavailable.189 For instance in Melendez-Diaz, 
                                                          
 183. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE CMTY. 
ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 232–33 (2009) [hereinafter A PATH 
FORWARD] (stressing the importance of training for operational scientists and 
the need for continuing education of analysts). 
 184. See id. at 233 (“Continuing education is critical for all personnel work-
ing in crime laboratories as well as for those in other forensic science disci-
plines. . . .”). 
 185. See id. at 195 (discussing the importance of accreditation standards to 
ensure organizational quality). 
 186. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[I]n 
order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be de-
rived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by ap-
propriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known. In short, 
the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ 
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”). 
 187. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 183, at 184 (“[T]he accuracy of forensic 
methods resulting in classification or individualization conclusions needs to be 
evaluated in well-designed and rigorously conducted studies.”). 
 188. See id. (“All results for every forensic method should indicate the un-
certainty in the measurements that are made . . . .”). 
 189. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that a 
court may exclude expert testimony when there are gaps between the evidence 
relied upon by an expert and the conclusion drawn). 
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the failure to identify which method of drug analysis was used 
prevented any reasonable assumption about its reliability.190 
D. ALL RESULTS AND RAW DATA 
A report should contain a clear, brief description of the re-
sults (e.g., “Sample ARG-0123LV exhibited a blood alcohol con-
tent of 0.163% when tested using Mass Spectroscopy (Method 
MPLSCLMS1200). The standard error for this method is +/- 
0.004%.”). Fundamental to the ability of other persons to con-
duct an independent review and assessment of the validity of 
the report is access to the raw data.191 Absent raw data, the re-
port resembles the affidavit of Melendez-Diaz, a bare assertion 
unsubstantiated by anything other than the witness’s state-
ment. Similarly, inclusion of the calibration information of the 
equipment is useful to eliminate a common potential error 
source.192 
E. AFFIRMATION BY THE ANALYST AND REVIEWER 
The inclusion of an analyst’s affirmative statement, which 
indicates the degree of accuracy and completeness of the sub-
mitted scientific evidence, may address concealment issues and 
also provide legal grounds for action against unethical practic-
es.193 This affirmative statement, however, potentially turns 
the report into an affidavit. While as a matter of principle, such 
statements should not be required for the report to be accurate 
and complete, their inclusion is similar to the purposes of the 
oath: namely to 1) focus the mind on the facts being estab-
lished, 2) establish a clear basis for punishment in the event of  
 
 
                                                          
 190. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 151, at 32 (“Indeed, there are at least 
seventeen different methods currently used for analyzing seized substances for 
the presence of drugs, each involving differing systematic error rates . . . .”). 
 191. See Nigel T. James, Scientific Method and Raw Data Should be Con-
sidered, 169 BRIT. MED. J. 4, 4 (1996) (“Those who are concerned with validity 
will examine raw data . . . .”). 
 192. See generally MICHAEL P. GALLAHER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF 
CALIBRATION ERROR IN MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (2004) (providing an ex-
ample of how calibration errors can lead to substantial costs). 
 193. See Margot Iverson, Should There Be an Oath for Scientists and Engi-
neers, AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. COMMITTEE ON SCI. FREEDOM & RESP. (Sept. 27, 
2000), http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/oath/oathsummary.htm (discuss-
ing the purposes, pros, cons, and possible methods of enforcement of an oath) 
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fraud, and 3) provide circumstantial guarantees of truthful-
ness.194 
Placing these reports within the ambit of a number of tra-
ditional hearsay exceptions by use of affirmative statements 
could provide the court with a broad basis for admission. These 
potential exceptions include present sense impressions, record-
ed recollections, business records, and public records. Sample 
statements include: 
 This report consists of results observed by the ana-
lyst.195 
 This report consists of the observations of the ana-
lyst recorded shortly after their occurrence and 
adopted by the analyst as true, accurate, and com-
pete.196 
 This report was produced by the analyst, a person 
with personal knowledge, at the time of testing, as 
part of the normal operation of this laboratory. This 
report is subject to independent review and confir-
mation of its validity.197 
 This report was produced as part of the state’s 
normal operation and is recorded as a public rec-
ord.198 
F. PUBLIC POSTING 
The only dependable guarantee of the reliability of a lab’s 
activities is review by competent, independent observers. The 
classic question of “Who watches the watchmen?”199 remains a 
powerful challenge when defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, 
and other public officials lack the expertise, resources, and dis-
position to investigate and evaluate the functioning of public 
and private labs. One of the lasting legacies of the Watergate 
era was the Freedom of Information Act: a tool for the citizenry 
to keep tabs on the government and the actions it takes in our 
names by forcing information into the public sphere.200 Our ju-
                                                          
 194. See id. 
 195. FED. R. EVI. 803(1). 
 196. FED. R. EVI. 803(1), (5). 
 197. FED. R. EVI. 803(6). 
 198. See FED. R. EVI. 803(8)(A)(i), (8)(B). 
 199. See JUVENAL, THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL 78 (Rolfe Humphries trans., 
Indiana University Press 1958) (“Who will be guarding the guards?”). 
 200. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
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dicial system has significant, even overwhelming, caseloads for 
prosecutors, public defenders, and judicial officers. The absence 
of data in the public sphere prevents private actors such as ac-
ademics, the media, or professional societies from assessing the 
validity of the work.201 Problems in forensic labs have only been 
uncovered by investigation, often triggered by inquiries in false 
conviction cases.202 
Courts have rejected the use of the public records hearsay 
exception when the documents were prepared for trial.203 
Melendez-Diaz is a plurality decision and, thus, should be read 
narrowly. However, current cases do not appear to prevent 
states from promulgating statutes establishing that posting 
test results, coupled with informing defense counsel of these re-
sults, say, thirty days prior to trial, is considered notice of the 
states’ intent to use the report to establish the facts therein.204 
This is the vein of the notice and demand statutes identified as 
acceptable to the plurality in Melendez-Diaz.205 This burden 
shifting is not trivial, but “notice and demand” is considered the 
most “benign” of the ipse dixit statutory approaches allowing 
admission of scientific evidence without cross-examination.206 
Requiring public posting of this information also encour-
ages standardization of the report format between laboratories 
and jurisdictions—something that aids prosecutors, defense at-
                                                          
 201. See Gross, supra note 115, at 1178–79. 
 202. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 117, at 14. 
 203. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“Business 
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because 
they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having 
been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the pur-
pose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”). 
 204. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2248 (2012) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (“In particular, the States could create an exception that presumptively 
would allow introduction of DNA reports from accredited crime laboratories.”). 
But see Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 
517 (“The United States Supreme Court . . . has firmly rejected the suggestion 
that a court may presume the ‘waiver of a fundamental right from inaction.’” 
(quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972)). 
 205. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326 (“[M]any [other states] permit the de-
fendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after 
receiving notice of the prosecution’s intent to use a forensic analyst’s report.”); 
see also Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 326–27. But see Metzger, supra note 204, at 
500 (“The forensic ipse dixit statutes swindle defendants out of the Confronta-
tion Clause’s ‘bedrock procedural guarantee.’” (quoting Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004))). 
 206. Metzger, supra note 204, at 481. 
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torneys, and the courts.207 Finally, availability means that sub-
sequent issues with the same defendant will be available for 
the courts to review.208 Online records are available to the 
judge from the bench at a moment’s notice.209 For instance, ad-
judication of DUI is an ongoing challenge; having the test re-
sults searchable and retrievable empowers courts to more effec-
tively evaluate defendants’ past activity. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court faces a new challenge with the ongoing devel-
opment of scientific evidence. What standards should apply to 
ensure that defendants are protected from unfounded accusa-
tions? The Court’s groundbreaking Crawford decision rightly 
provided protection against the “note taking police officer” by 
preventing the admission of unsubstantiated hearsay. Howev-
er, the current cases—Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Wil-
liams—do not effectively delineate when a nontraditional wit-
ness will be required to be confronted, even when the issue is 
not contested by the defendant at trial.210 More troubling, the 
Court has not demanded that scientific evidence, presented live 
or by report, live up to the standard established in Daubert. 
While all sides agree that scientific evidence is especially pro-
bative, the refusal to demand evidence of reliability, method 
validation, and scientific consensus has allowed shoddy work 
and practices to impersonate dependable science in our courts. 
This is an injustice to the innocent and the guilty alike, and the 
Court should require Daubert validity for foundation before ac-
cepting scientific evidence into court. 
In contrast, the ongoing dispute in the Court about requir-
ing analysts to testify before admitting scientific findings miss-
es the mark. Such testimony does not reveal sloppy or criminal 
behavior at crime labs. The requirement for direct confronta-
                                                          
 207. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Pub. Health, California Influenza Surveillance 
Project, CA.GOV, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/dcdc/Pages/ CaliforniaIn-
fluenzaSurveillanceProject.aspx (last modified Mar. 29, 2013) (noting that la-
boratories that report data regarding influenza and other respiratory virus 
detections help standardize treatment and detection). 
 208. Author’s observation of Assistant Chief Judge Ivy Bernhardson, 
Hennepin County District Court (May–Aug. 2012). I requested her clerk to ac-
cess publicly available records to assess statements by one of the defendants in 
a case. 
 209. Author’s observation of Assistant Chief Judge Ivy Bernhardson, 
Hennepin Country Courts (May–Aug. 2012). 
 210. E.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 305. 
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tion of laboratory technicians does not prevent unjust incarcer-
ation. In contrast, the use of scientific testing has freed hun-
dreds of wrongfully convicted persons.211 Diverting resources 
from the second use to the first will result in more innocent 
persons spending more time in prison.212 While the Court’s re-
quirement would not matter in an ideal, non-resource con-
strained world, this is not the world of the district and state 
courts.213 More, not fewer, unjust convictions are the cost of ap-
plying Crawford to scientific evidence, and it is a cost incon-
sistent with our principles.214 
The move to require the analyst to be present and testify 
will result in lower quality scientific evidence in our courts. In 
addition to the resource argument advanced above, the re-
quirement for testimony will discourage the use of national la-
boratories, such as the FBI crime lab. The result will be that 
local labs will conduct a wider variety of analyses on a less fre-
quent basis and with a greater opportunity for error. Alterna-
tively, the state may choose to generate or present only a single 
type of DNA analysis instead of both STR (Short Tandem Re-
peats) and PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) as was done in 
the Kocak case.215 This decision will result in less scientific   
                                                          
 211. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 125. 
 212. Brief of the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, Wyoming, & the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent at 2, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2008) (No. 
07-591) (“As stewards of the public’s resources, the amici States have two in-
terests. The first is to spend the lion’s share of the public’s money where it 
matters most: on the front lines, fighting and preventing continued drug 
abuse. The second is to keep our technicians in the laboratory, whenever pos-
sible, to handle the daily influx of drug analysis requests . . . .”). 
 213. See, e.g., Reporter’s Partial Transcript at 7, State of California v. 
Kocak, No. SCD110465 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995) (“Mr. Ara-
gon [Defense counsel]: ‘First of all, Mr. Carpenter, does this mean that 
Cellmark still gets their $1200 a day?’ Mr. Carpenter [prosecutor]: ‘I believe 
so.’”). That was in addition to expenses, in this case including flying the ana-
lyst to California to testify. See id. 
 214. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (“These rules are to be interpreted to provide 
for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in 
procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay.”). 
 215. See Reporter’s Partial Transcript, supra note 213, at 5. 
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data being available to all parties, including juries,216 which 
surely hurts innocent defendants. 
The ineffectiveness of the courts in detecting the rare but 
real instances of scientific fraud or misconduct must be correct-
ed. The courts have failed to act as gatekeepers against unreli-
able evidence, allowing shoddy work and bare accusations to be 
placed into evidence. Only by exposing lab reports to public 
scrutiny will crime labs be motivated to engage in the im-
provement of operations and procedures that will assure de-
fendants and courts access to accurate and reliable testing. 
Fortunately, advances in information technology have made 
publishing this information cheaper and more effective than 
was previously imaginable. Without reliable, early access to the 
test results, defendants have little chance to effectively contest 
those results in court. By not requiring labs to conform to the 
Daubert standard for the admission of scientific evidence, the 
courts continue to allow unreliable conjecture to masquerade as 
scientific fact to juries. 
 
                                                          
 216. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 341 (2009) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (“By requiring analysts also to appear in the far greater 
number of cases where defendants do not dispute the analyst’s result, the 
Court imposes enormous costs on the administration of justice.”). 
